[SEEK-Taxon] RE: LinneanCore Group Work

[franz@nceas.ucsb.edu]

Hi Rich:

   we may be getting somehwhere, let's keep track. I your previous e-mails, you
wrote:

- that my example 1 wasn't strictly nomenclatural, but primarily a concept issue
(let's see - no types, no diagnosis, no constituents - but still a concept);

- that most (!) zoolgists view "replacement names" and botanists view "nomina
nova" as purely nomenclatural (in response to my question 2 which you later
answer with "yes" [it's concept-stuff] as well - likely in disagreement with James);

- that you like Berendsohn's vagueness, but are yourself not vague enough to
move on the "a type does not make a concept" position - good luck finding the
answer in Berendsohn's papers;

- that your notion of concepts is more liberal than Jessie's, except for that
bit about types which you consider exempt from the criteria sufficient to create
a concept, but then you (correctly, in my view) back-paddle somwhat "I would
slightly prefer to surrender this one point of universe overlap over to the
concept side";

- that the LC should handle nomenclatural things within the TCS (even though -
as I understand - the LC rejects the sec. annotation which is central to what I
call TCS's goal 1);

- your breaking-down of my examples into nomenclatural vs. concept information
is completely redundant! there is not a single string of information in the
nomenclatural part that you don't also represent in the concept part; I assume
you understand that two concepts can have multiple kinds of relationships to
each other (some type-related, others set-theory related)?; I see your
distinction here as one of the stronger arguments to ABANDON the
nomenclatural/concept-related distinction; well done, I suppose; 

- "Stated another way: Aus bus Smith 1949 is a fundamentally different unit of
information than Aus bus Smith 1949 SEC. Smith 1949." I had to quote this,
because it has a bit of a PhyloCodian ("philosophical correctness") ring to it;
the fundamental difference to you is "just the type - no concept yet"; that is
only YOUR view Rich, not James', not mine, not Jessie's, not Berendsohn's. On
the surface, Aus bus Smith 1949 doesn't exist outside of a publication context.
Berendsohn thought that was fundamental to him, in order to identify Smith's
1949 mention of Aus Bus uniquely. Since you already above conceded that without
mentioning types (my examples 1 & 2) one can have concepts, but then maintain
that solely mentioning types doesn't imply concepts (as if those mentions didn't
also exist only in print), I would venture that few will follow your position;
it is actually quite idiosyncratic;

- at the end of the first e-mail; you ask what is meant by "strictly
nomenclatural procedures" (as opposed just "information"); how about (your
example) "linkage of 4 & 5 as homotypic synonyms?"; linking is a procedure, done
  by (sec.) someone;

   I your second e-mail (response partly to James), you wrote:

- that because some aspects of Smith's 1949 "Aus bus" fall under the Codes'
rules whereas none of Pyle's 2000 "Aus bus" would, PARTS of Smith don't receive
a "sec.", but Smith 1949 still receives a "sec."; again - ALL NOMENCLATURAL
NOVELTIES ARE PUBLISHED BE SOMEONE - that's the TCS's criterion; the purity of
nomenclature is threatened in no way by Berendsohn's concept approach;

- that you cannot follow my goal 1 / goal 2 distinction; in a nutshell: if we
adhere only to goal 2 (communication about nature) then some experts will
definitely not consider certain types of information to be concepts (you're one
of them, Rich), yet the greater significance of achievieng 1 (precise
information management - tying name uses to authors) forced the TCS to ignore
those objections;

- then you do a 360 on your previous view: "I am very sympathetic to this point
of view, because in my own data model (Taxonomer), I effectively take the stand
that Name+Publication=Assertion, and Assertion=Potential Concept;" THEN you
reserve again: "there are strictly nomenclatural connections between
Name+Publication (as governed by Codes of nomenclature) that have absolutely
nothing to do with Taxonomic Concepts (which I define here as abstract
definitions of sets or circumscriptions of organisms);" so within one paragraph,
you promote concepts (1) as "name sec. reference" (that's goal 2, btw) and then
(2) as "abstract definitions of sets of organisms [more than just the type!, I
suppose]"  (that's goal 1, btw); which is it, Rich, and which should it be for
the TCS?; 

- that "Indeed, if [I] dissect [your] arguments in this context, many of them
run counter to what [you] express (and still believe) through Taxonomer;" - this
is because in Taxonomer you are open to Berendsohnian vagueness, but when it
comes to the LC/TCS interaction you are not; 

****

   In summary, you have not convinced me at all (or yourself in Taxonomer, for
that matter) that there is anything "inpedendent" about nomenclature that would
take a serious hit if represented as a concept. Or about nomenclatural relations
that as represented as "sec." relatioship assertions. Look at Linnaean taxonomy
as "concepts 'light'," and at the Codes as "concepts 'light' manuals." Forget
the objective/subjective distinction, it is irrelevant here (and probably wrong
too). Then your position about concepts will become consistent with your own
practice, and consistent with the TCS.

Cheers,

Nico

Nico M. Franz
National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis
735 State Street, Suite 300
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

Phone: (805) 966-1677; Fax: (805) 892-2510; E-mail: franz at nceas.ucsb.edu
Website: http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/~franz/

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